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Abstract 
Typing passwords is vulnerable to shoulder-surfing 
attacks. We proposed a shoulder-surfing resistant 
scheme embedded in traditional textual passwords in 
this study. With the proposed scheme, when the 
password field is on focus, a pattern appears in it as a 
hint to tell the user how to enter a password. Following 
the hint, the user needs to skip some characters while 
typing the password. The characters to be skipped are 
randomly selected so that an observer will not be able 
to see the whole password even if the authentication 
procedure was recorded. We evaluated the proposed 
scheme in a usability study. Compared to traditional 
passwords, our scheme achieved a similar level of 
accuracy while only required marginal additional time 
to authenticate users. Participants also expressed 
significantly higher acceptance of the new technique for 
security-sensitive applications and gave it significantly 
higher ratings in perceived security, shoulders-surfing 
resistance, camera-recording resistance, and guess-
attack resistance.  
1. Introduction
Passwords are the most prevalent user 
authentication method on current digital devices [1, 2]. 
Given the important role of passwords, it is critical to 
keep them safe. Traditional passwords are alphanumeric 
[3]. They require users to enter them with keyboards. 
However, typing on keyboards is vulnerable to 
observation attacks, such as shoulder-surfing, which 
means stealing users’ information, such as passwords, 
PINs, and other sensitive information, by looking over 
someone’s shoulder [1, 2]. Shoulder-surfing is quite 
common in real life [4], but quite difficult to defeat [1, 
5]. The popularity of recording devices, such as mobile 
phones, surveillance cameras, etc., make shoulder-
surfing even easier. It is important to make passwords 
shoulder-surfing resistant, especially for security-
sensitive applications, such as ATMs and personal 
banking apps on mobile phones, etc. 
Entering passwords by users is the weakest point in 
the chain of encrypting passwords and authenticating 
users [1, 2, 6]. Many existing shoulder-surfing resistant 
methods e.g., Convex Hull Click (CHC) [7], EvoPass 
[8], S3APS [9], [10], [11], [12] etc., focused on 
increasing the difficulty of disambiguating users’ input 
to guess the passwords. Current shoulder-surfing 
resistant schemes typically achieve a higher level of 
security at the cost of reduced usability [1], such as long 
login time [6] as observed in Convex Hull Click [7], 
Déjà Vu [13], [14], and [15]. Some techniques, e.g., 
EvoPass [8] and [15] are not effective for an attacker 
with a recording device. Some approaches are quite 
complicated e.g., [11, 12, 16], and require extensive 
training and practice. Another common limitation is that 
these methods typically do not support traditional 
passwords, although they are still the most commonly 
used authentication method across many applications 
and devices. 
In this study, we proposed and evaluated a 
shoulder-surfing resistant password scheme embedded 
in traditional passwords with a flat learning curve. It 
mitigates both shoulder-surfing and video recording 
attacks, and meanwhile keeps the advantages of 
traditional passwords, such as faster authentication 
speed, high user familiarity, and prevalent usage across 
applications and devices. 
2. Related work
Existing shoulder-surfing resistant passwords are 
categorized and discussed below. 
2.1. Graphical schemes 
Graphical passwords use images or shapes instead 
of characters for better memorability [17]. However, a 
common limitation of graphical passwords is that they 
are more vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attacks [2, 5, 9, 
14, 16, 18]. Some graphical passwords schemes were 
developed to resolve the problem. EvoPass [8] is an 
evolvable graphical password authentication scheme. It 
transforms password images into sketches and gradually 





degrades them to provide less and less visual 
information to increase the difficulty to guess the pass 
sketches. However, it may not be effective for shoulder-
surfing attacks with cameras. With the Convex Hull 
Click (CHC) scheme [7], users first identify their 
password icons. During the authentication procedure, 
users need to recognize their password icons among a 
much larger number of distracting icons. Instead of 
clicking on those password icons, users click within the 
convex hull of their password icons. It does not require 
users to click directly on their password icons, which 
makes the technique shoulder-surfing resistant. The 
triangle scheme proposed by Sobrado and Birget [19] is 
similar to CHC. To be authenticated, users need to find 
three of the password icons and click inside the invisible 
triangle created by them. Sobrado and Birget [19] also 
introduced the movable frame scheme, which requires 
users to move a password object to line up with another 
two password objects. Other special geometric 
configurations can also be used to determine the 
location the user needs to click, for example, the 
intersection of two invisible lines formed by four 
password icons [19]. Por et al. [11] proposed a shoulder-
surfing resistant graphical password based on digraph 
substitution rules. They use the locations of pre-selected 
images to determine the locations of the password 
images based on several rules. For example, if two pre-
selected images appear diagonal to each other in a grid 
of images, the row of the first image is the row for the 
password image, and the column of the second pre-
selected image is the column for the password image. 
PairPassChar (PPC) also use similar rules to determine 
the icons to click on [16]. The method proposed by [12] 
requires users to remember three types of objects and to 
do different interactions on the screen based on complex 
rules, which can be challenging for users. A common 
drawback of those methods is that they require users to 
repeat the procedure to identify the right images or the 
right points/areas on an image or to move the password 
icons to the right locations (as in [19]) for several 
rounds, which increases the time they take for 
authentication. In fact, Abdullah et al. [20] evaluated 12 
graphical password schemes and found 11 were 
considered as inefficient. 
2.2. Textual-graphical schemes 
Some schemes are both textual and graphical. The 
method proposed by Chen et al. [10] is based on both 
texts and colors. In the registration phase, a user sets a 
textual password and picks a color as the pass-color. In 
the login phrase, the system presents a wheel with eight 
equally-sized sections and each section has multiple 
characters on it. Around the wheel, there are eight color 
arcs. The user needs to rotate the wheel multiple times 
so that each character in the passwords is within the arc 
of the right color. TricolorPairPassChar (TPPC) is also 
color-based [16]. Users need to follow complex rules 
related to both the locations and the colors of characters 
in a large grid to determine the right characters in a 
password. Remembering all the rules can increase users’ 
cognitive load. The pair-based authentication scheme 
proposed in [21] uses a pair of pre-selected letters in a 
grid to determine the location of a letter in a password. 
One pre-selected letter is to determine the row and the 
other is used to select the column. The hybrid textual 
authentication scheme in [21] uses pairs of colors to 
represent the location of the password characters in a 
grid. Users need to remember the numbers represented 
by different colors, which could increase users’ memory 
burden [10]. The idea of S3APS [9] is similar to the 
triangle scheme [19] and CHC [7]. The major difference 
is that S3APS presents text to the user instead of icons. 
It also requires multiple rounds of interaction from the 
user to select each character in the password, which can 
be inefficient [10]. Some textual-graphical passwords 
make it possible to enter the password with a keyboard. 
However, they do not solve the long login time issue 
related to graphical passwords. In addition, color-based 
schemes can be challenging for people with color 
deficiencies. Although this group of authentication 
methods is textual-graphic, they are very different from 
traditional passwords and do not preserve the 
advantages of the latter, such as fast authentication 
speed, high user familiarity, and prevalent usage across 
applications and devices. 
2.3. Biometric methods 
Biometric methods, such as fingerprint, Face ID, 
and retina scan, could provide a higher level of security 
at the expense of increased hardware and software costs 
[2]. In addition, a device needs to have access to the 
biometric data of the user for authentication. For 
example, users must register their fingerprints before 
they can be used for authentication. Therefore, 
biometric methods cannot be used without storing the 
biometric data first, which can cause additional 
concerns on privacy and security, especially on public 
devices, such as lab computers and bank ATMs, etc. 
Gesture dynamics were used in [22] for continuous user 
authentication. DooDB [23] is also based on the 
dynamics of drawing gestures, such as speed and 
acceleration. Behavioral biometrics, such as keystroke 
dynamics and gesture dynamics, do not need expensive 
hardware, but introduces privacy issues [24]. 
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2.4. Haptic-based techniques 
Malek et al. [14] developed a haptic-based 
graphical password against shoulder-surfing attacks. 
Users need to draw a secret pattern on a grid and press 
harder for certain strokes in the pattern. Attackers won’t 
be able to observe whether the pressure was applied 
while draws the strokes. In addition to input pressure, 
vibration is also used for authentication. With 
TictocPIN [25], users are informed through vibrations 
and simulated vibration sound. The Phone Lock is a PIN 
entry system [26] based on haptic cues. Users can enter 
a PIN using auditory or tactile stimuli. In [27], 
passwords are encoded as a sequence of vibration 
patterns to prevent shoulder-surfing attacks. VibraPass 
[28] was designed for ATM authentication using tactile
feedback provided by the users’ own mobile devices to
determine what to enter. For example, when users’
mobile phone vibrates, they enter a false character, if
not, a correct one in the password. H4Plock [29]  also
used vibration cues. Haptic-based methods have special
requirements for hardware, such as sensors for pressure
and electric motors for vibration, which may limit their
usage.
2.5. Extra hardware 
Some techniques rely on extra hardware. Xside [30] 
allows users to enter a password using both the front and 
the back of a smartphone. EyePassword [1] enables 
gaze-based typing for password entry to make it difficult 
for an attacker to glean the password. Eye trackers were 
also used in [31-34]. Pass-thought [35] is an 
authentication scheme based on the Brain-Computer 
Interface technology. The extra hardware requirements 
limit the adaption of those techniques on regular 
devices, such as ATMs.  
Some common challenges of existing techniques 
include 1) many anti-shoulder-surfing mechanisms 
increase the noise for the observer to make it more 
difficult to disambiguate a user’ input, which usually 
also require more interactions from the user for 
authentication [1], and require a long time for 
authentication; 2) existing techniques are very different 
from traditional textual passwords, and they are not 
compatible with the latter despite their popularity; 3) 
some shoulder-surfing resistance schemes require 
additional hardware or software. 
3. Proposed scheme
Textual passwords are still the most popular 
authentication methods. None of the techniques 
mentioned in section 2 solves the shoulder-surfing 
problem and keeps the authentication procedure of the 
traditional passwords. To fill the void, a shoulder-
surfing resistant scheme embedded in traditional textual 
passwords was proposed as in Figure 1.  
When a password field is on focus, a pattern shows 
up in the password field as a hint (referred to as hint 
pattern hereinafter) as in Figure 1 to tell a user how to 
enter a password. The user needs to enter characters at 
‘O’s but skip those at ‘X’s. The “…” at the end of the 
pattern means there could be more characters in the 
password but was not included in the pattern. If a 
password is shorter than the pattern, the user can stop 
after finishing the password. 
Skipping characters at ‘X’s 
Figure 1. Proposed authentication scheme 
The proposed scheme asks users to skip 2-4 
randomly selected characters in a password in order to 
against shoulder-surfing attacks. Since a password is 
entered partially, an observer cannot steal the full-length 
password even if the input procedure was recorded. 
During password entry, the characters to be skipped are 
randomly selected. As a result, when an attacker tries to 
log into the system, the chance that the same hint pattern 
will be shown is low. In fact, there are 495 different hint 
patterns to skip 4 characters in a 12-character password. 
Moreover, we make sure the system does not repeat the 
same hint pattern within several consecutive attempts. 
Each time the password text field is clicked and 
becomes on focus, it is recorded as one authentication 
attempt. Incorrect attempts will be recorded to prevent 
an attacker from trying to find the same pattern that has 
observed. To prevent guessing attacks, including brute-
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force attacks, our method employs a lock out policy to 
block a user who fails to enter the correct password after 
several attempts. For example, if a user enters wrong 
passwords for five times in a row, an email for two-
factor authentication will be sent to the owner’s email 
account to notice him/her the suspicious authentication 
attempts. The allowed number of attempts and the 
number of the characters to be skipped can be 
determined by the user.  
When two characters are skipped, if an attacker 
observed an authentication procedure and obtained the 
rest of the password, there are 95 possibilities for each 
of the skipped character (26 lower case letters, 26 upper 
case letters, 10 digits, and 33 special characters). The 
attacker could have to guess up to 9025 (95*95) times 
to get the correct password. Similarly, with four 
omissions, attackers could have to guess up to 954 times. 
According to Kwon and Hong [25], 625 possibilities 
could be considered large enough to deter brute-force 
attacks. With only skipping two characters, our number 
is far above 625. 
A partial password challenges users with a subset 
of characters from a full password [36]. Users are 
required to enter randomly selected characters at 
specific positions, such as the second, third, and sixth 
characters from their passwords [36]. Although our 
design also requires users to enter a subset of their 
passwords, it has some unique features: 1) To enter the 
letter at specific positions as in partial passwords, e.g., 
the second, third and sixth characters in a password, 
users have to recall both the characters and the positions, 
which is very challenging. With our design, a pattern 
hint is provided in the password field to tell the user to 
skip some characters while they are entering their 
passwords. Entered and skipped characters are marked 
with dots the same way as traditional passwords do 
(Figure 2(b)). Since skipping is embedded in the flow of 
entering a password, users only need to skip a character 
when they see an ‘X’ and they do not need to count the 
position number of the ‘X’. Compared to recalling a 
character at a specific position, our design requires a 
lower cognitive load. 2) Partial passwords usually 
challenge the user with two or three characters [36]. 
Users only need to enter two or three characters, which 
is vulnerable to brute-force attacks. With our design, 
even after skipping some characters, the password 
length will still be much longer than two or three 
characters. For example, if the initial password has 12 
characters and three of them are skipped, the password 
still has nine characters. It is still more brute-force attack 
resistant than partial passwords with two or three 
characters. 3) The proposed scheme is embedded in a 
traditional password, it preserves the benefits of the 
latter, such as user familiarity, and prevalent usage 
across different applications and devices. Besides, 
previous research on partial passwords, such as [36-38], 
did not evaluate the usability and user perceptions of 
partial passwords in their studies, and there is little 
academic research on partial passwords despite their 
usage in the industry [36, 37].  We want to fill the void 
in this study. 
According to [6], shoulder-surfing attacks can be 
divided into three types: 1) attacks with naked eyes only, 
2) recording the authentication procedure once, and 3)
recording the authentication procedure more than once.
Our design focuses on the first two types of attacks, and
the third type is out of the scope of this study. In other
words, our method is more suitable for security-
sensitive but occasionally used applications, such as
online banking accounts. Our method could be an add-
on feature for traditional passwords, and users can
enable it when they feel they are being observed or
recorded, such as in a public place with surveillance
cameras or while withdrawing money from ATMs.
(a) A hint pattern to skip three characters appears when
the password field is on focus 
(b) Entered and skipped characters are marked with
dots 
Figure 2. Hint patterns during password 
entry 
4. Evaluation
We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment 
with a within-subject design to compare the proposed 
scheme with traditional passwords. 
4.1. Participants 
30 (13 female and 17 male) students from a 
university in the United States participated in this study. 
12 were younger than 20 years old, 13 between 20 and 
25 years old, 3 between 26 and 30 years old, and 2 were 
over 30 years old. They received a $10 gift card for 
participating in the study. 
4.2. Apparatus 
The proposed scheme was implemented in Java 
using Android Studio. The app was installed on a 
Google Pixel Phone with the 7.1.1 Android OS and a 
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5.0-inch AMOLED Full HD Touchscreen. The default 
QWERTY keyboard was used to enter passwords during 
the study. 
4.3. Experiment tasks 
Participants were required to enter a password they 
created for 10 times in each of the four task conditions, 
namely entering the regular password as they usually do, 
skipping 2 characters in the password, skipping 3 
characters, and skipping 4 characters (referred as 
Regular, Skipping 2, Skipping 3, and Skipping 4 
conditions hereinafter). There were 40 tasks in total. A 
sample task is shown in Figure 3. In figure 3(b), a 
participant clicked the password field, and the hint 
pattern to skip three characters appeared in the password 
field. The participant needed to enter his/her password 
while skipping the character at ‘X’s. 
      (a)                                        (b) 
Figure 3. An experiment task 
4.4. Independent and dependent measures 
The independent variable is the four password entry 
conditions, namely Regular, Skipping 2, Skipping 3, 
and Skipping 4. 
The dependent variables are password entry speed, 
accuracy, and user perceptions. When the "START” 
button (Figure 3(a)) was clicked, the system recorded 
the time as the starting time for the task. When the 
“LOGIN” button was clicked (Figure 3(b)), the time was 
recorded as the completing time for the task. 
7-point Likert scale questions were created to
assess user perceptions, including “Acceptance”, 
“Perceived Security”, “Shoulder-Surfing Resistance”, 
“Camera-Recording Resistance”, “Guessing-Attack 
Resistance”, “Ease of Use”, “Efficiency”, and “Overall 
Satisfaction”. The questionnaire items are presented in 
Table 1.  
Table 1. Questionnaire items 
Factors Items (1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 7 = 
“Strongly Agree”) 
Acceptance I am likely to choose this method for 
security-sensitive applications, such as 
online banking, when in a public place. 
Perceived 
Security 
This method makes me feel safe to enter my 
passwords for security-sensitive 












I think this method resists guessing attacks. 
Ease of Use I think the method was easy to use to enter 
a password. 
Efficiency I was able to enter my password quickly 
using this method. 
Overall 
Satisfaction 
Overall, I am satisfied with this password 
entry method. 
4.5. Procedure 
After signing a consent form, participants 
completed a demographic questionnaire. Then, they 
were required to create a password for the study. 
According to the commonly used guidelines, passwords 
should have at least eight characters with a mixture of 
upper and lower case letters, digits [19], and special 
characters [39]. We required participants to include at 
least 12 characters in their passwords. As a result, after 
skipping four characters, the rest of the passwords 
would still meet the eight-character length requirement. 
We also asked participants to use mixed upper- and 
lower-case letters, digits, and special characters. After 
creating the passwords, participants went through a 
training session to learn how to use the proposed scheme 
to skip 2, 3, and 4 characters while typing their 
passwords. After they felt comfortable with the 
proposed scheme, the experiment would start. 
Participants sat in a chair when they did the tasks. They 
could take breaks as they liked between tasks. The order 
of the four task conditions was counterbalanced with a 
Latin-square design. 
After finishing the tasks, participants answered a 
questionnaire for user perceptions. Guessing attacks and 
shoulder-surfing attacks were explained to them.  To 
make sure participants understand shoulder-surfing 
attacks, the following sketches as in Figure 4 were used 
to explain the concepts before they answer the 
questionnaire. 
Page 7148
Those sketches show examples of shoulder-surfing 
attacks. While the user is using the phone, the 
attacker is trying to see what is on the screen (e.g., 
passwords, PINs, websites, etc.) without and with a 
recording device.  
 
Figure 4. Sketches of shoulder-surfing 
attacks 
5. Results
5.1. Password entry speed 
The password entry speed of the four conditions was 
measured by “Task Completion Time”. The means of 
the “Task Completion Time” for the four conditions are 
in Figure 5. The Repeated measures ANOVA results 
show that there were significant differences among the 
four conditions in “Task Completion Time” (F(1.90, 55.10) 
= 54.19, p < 0.001) with Greenhouse–Geisser correction 
for sphericity violation. The regular condition took 
significantly less time than the other three conditions (p 
< 0.001). Skipping 2 was also faster than the other 
conditions (p < 0.001). There was no significant 
difference between Skipping 3 and Skipping 4.  
Figure 5. Task Completion Time, Number of 
Correct Inputs, and Times of Error Correction 
of four conditions 
Compared to the Regular condition, Skipping 2 
required additional 2.26 seconds. Skipping 3 required 
additional 3.56 seconds and Skipping 4 needed 
additional 4.28 seconds. Overall, the average additional 
time to skip one character was 1.13 seconds. 
5.2. Password entry accuracy 
The password entry accuracy of the four conditions 
was measured by the “Number of Correct Inputs” for 10 
tasks and also the “Times of Error Correction” during 
the authentication procedure as in Figure 5. For 
example, if a participant thought a wrong character was 
entered and deleted all the characters had been entered 
and then re-typed the password, it is considered as one 
time of error correction. The larger the “Times of Error 
Correction”, the more error-prone the condition is. 
Repeated measures ANOVA results show that there was 
no significant difference among the four conditions in 
“Number of Correct Inputs” (F(3, 87) = 2.20, p > 0.05) and 
“Times of Error Correction” (F(3, 87) = 2.06, p > 0.05). 
5.3. User perceptions 
The means and medians of the user perception 
factors (‘1’ = the lowest perceptions and ‘7’ = the 
highest) are presented in Table 2. The main effects of 
conditions were all significant except for “Overall 
Satisfaction” (Table 2). The Greenhouse–Geisser 
method was used for sphericity violation correction.  
Table 2. Means and medians of user 
perception 

























































































































































* p< 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001


















Skipping 3 Skipping 4
User User Attacker Attacker with a 
recording device 
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We also conducted pairwise comparisons when the 
main effects of conditions were significant as indicated 
in the last column in Table 2. The results were presented 
in Table 3. 
For “Acceptance”, “Perceived Security”, 
“Shoulder-Surfing Resistance”, “Camera-Recording 
Resistance”, and “Guessing-Attack Resistance”, the 
Regular condition received scores significantly lower 
than those of other conditions. However, for “Ease of 
Use” and “Efficiency”, the scores of the Regular 
condition were significantly higher than those of the 
other conditions. 
For “Perceived Security”, “Shoulder-Surfing 
Resistance”, “Camera-Recording Resistance”, and 
“Guessing-Attack Resistance”, Skipping 2 received 
lower scores comparing to Skipping 3 and Skipping 4. 
However, for “Ease of Use” and “Efficiency”, the scores 
of the Skipping 2 condition were significantly higher 
than those of Skipping 3 and Skipping 4. Moreover, 
Skipping 3 and Skipping 4 did not have significant 
difference for all factors except for “Shoulder-Surfing 
Resistance” and “Camera-Recording Resistance”. For 
“Overall Satisfaction”, the main effect of conditions was 
not significant (p > 0. 05), although Skipping 2 achieved 
the highest score. 
Table 3. Pairwise comparisons of user 
perceptions 
Factors Pairwise comparison 
Acceptance R < S1, S2, 
S3*** 
S2 < S4* S2=S3 
S3=S4 
Perceived Security R < S1, S2, 
S3*** 
S2 < S3**  




R < S1, S2, 
S3*** 
S2 < S3*** 




R < S1, S2, 
S3*** 
S2 < S3*** 




R < S1, S2, 
S3*** 
S2 < S3** 
S2 < S4** 
S3=S4 
Ease of Use R > S1, S2, 
S3*** 
S2 > S3** 
S2 > S4*** 
S3=S4 
Efficiency R > S1, S2, 
S3*** 
S2 > S3*** 
S2 > S4*** 
S3=S4 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
R: Regular; S2: Skipping 2; S3: Skipping 3; S4: Skipping 4
<: significantly smaller than; >: significantly larger than; =: no
significant difference between
6. Discussion
The study results show that our scheme required 
marginal additional time compared to traditional 
passwords and achieved a similar level of accuracy. 
Overall, the average additional time to skip one 
character was 1.13 seconds, and most importantly 
skipping characters does not hurt password entry 
accuracy. Our scheme did not generate more errors in 
the final password strings entered for authentication. 
Meanwhile, it did not cause significantly more 
corrections during the authentication procedure. In fact, 
our method showed faster speed than existing shoulder-
surfing resistant techniques, such as Convex Hull Click 
[7],  Déjà Vu [13], [14], and [15]. Convex Hull Click 
Scheme took 72 seconds on average to authenticate a 
user [7]. Déjà Vu required 32 seconds. The method in 
[14] needed 78 seconds. Roth et al. [15] also found it
took users about ten times longer to enter a PIN with
their methods than with a regular keyboard. Those
techniques against shoulder-surfing come at the price of
longer authentication time. On the contrary, our method
protects users from shoulder-surfing attacks without
greatly sacrificing authentication speed. Furthermore,
we observed a very flat learning curve during the study.
Participants generally needed no more than ten minutes
for the training session. In addition, these existing
methods are quite different from and incompatible with
traditional passwords. However, our method is
embedded in traditional passwords, without requiring
additional hardware or software. It retains the
advantages of traditional textual passwords, such as fast
authentication speed, user familiarity, and popularity.
We believe it has the potential to be used widely for
security-sensitive applications across different devices.
The mean of the Regular condition for 
“Acceptance” is 2.77 ( ‘1’ = the lowest perceptions and 
‘7’ = the highest), which means that participants did not 
want to use traditional passwords for security-sensitive 
applications, such as online banking, when in a public 
place. Participants showed significantly higher interest 
in our method, especially with skipping 4 characters, for 
security-sensitive applications. 
Moreover, Skipping 2, Skipping 3, and Skipping 4 
received 5.10, 5.70, and 6.20 for “Shoulder-surfing 
Resistant”, while the score for the Regular condition 
was only 2.00.  It seems the more characters skipped the 
more secure the participants felt. We see similar trends 
for “Perceived Security”, “Camera-recording 
Resistance”, and “Guessing-attack Resistance”.  
We also see an obvious tradeoff between usability 
and security in Tables 2 and 3. Although skipping more 
characters could increase security, it also decreased the 
scores for “Ease of Use” and “Efficiency”. For “Overall 
Satisfaction”, although the main effect of conditions 
was not significant, “Skipping 2” achieved the highest 
score. Probably skipping two characters balanced the 
tradeoff best between security and usability among all 
conditions. It is noteworthy that we did not mean to 
replace traditional passwords with the proposed scheme 
in any situation. Our method could be an add-on feature 
for traditional passwords, and users can enable it when 
they feel they are being observed or recorded, such as in 
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a public place with surveillance cameras or while 
withdrawing money from ATMs. 
There are some limitations in this study. Our 
scheme showed advantages against shoulder-surfing 
attacks with and without camera recording, but it is not 
effective for repeated observations. As a result, our 
scheme cannot resist shoulder-surfing attacks conducted 
by close friends or family members who have the chance 
to observe the victim multiple times. Nevertheless, for 
security-sensitive applications, such as banking account 
and ATMs, users usually do not enter passwords 
repeatedly in a short period of time. Thus, we believe 
the chance for a stranger to observe the authentication 
procedure repeatedly could be low. One way to fight 
against repeated observation is to make sure hint 
patterns for consecutive authentication attempts have a 
least one common character to skip. However, it may 
still not be effective enough for attackers who can 
observe the victim many times. Second, we did not 
address the memorability issue of textual password in 
this study. We would like to explore more in those 
aspects in our future study. 
7. Conclusion
In this study, we designed and empirically 
evaluated a shoulder-surfing resistant scheme 
embedded in traditional passwords. When a password 
field is on focus, a pattern shows up on the screen in the 
password field as a hint to tell the user how to enter a 
password. The user needs to skip some randomly 
selected characters so that attackers will not be able to 
observe the whole password. Many existing shoulder-
surfing techniques, such as graphical passwords, are 
quite different from traditional passwords and require 
users to learn new authentication schemes. Different 
from those techniques, our method has a flat learning 
curve and can be seamlessly embedded in traditional 
passwords. As a result, it retains the benefits of 
traditional passwords, such as fast authentication speed, 
user familiarity, and the prevalent usage across different 
applications and devices, and meanwhile against 
shoulder-surfing and recording attacks. Participants 
showed interest in using it for security-sensitive 
techniques. 
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